博弈与信息（第三版）GAMES AND INFORMATION, THIRD EDITION
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GAMES AND INFORMATION, THIRD EDITION
An Introduction to Game Theory
Eric Rasmusen
Basil Blackwell
Contents1
(starred sections are less important)
Preface
Contents and Purpose
Changes in the Second Edition
Changes in the Third Edition
Using the Book
The Level of Mathematics
Other Books
Acknowledgements
Introduction
History
Game Theory's Method
Exemplifying Theory
This Book's Style
Notes
PART I GAME THEORY
1 The Rules of the Game
1.1 Deˉnitions
1.2 Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma
1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes, and
Ranked Coordination
1xxx February 2, 2000. Eric Rasmusen, Erasmuse@indiana.edu. Footnotes starting
with xxx are the author's notes to himself. Comments are welcomed.
1.5 Focal Points
Notes
Problems
2 Information
2.1 The Extensive Form of a Game
2.2 Information Sets
2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information
2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games
*2.5 Example: The Png Settlement Game
Notes
Problems
3 Continuous and Mixed Strategies
3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game
3.2 Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies
3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The
Civic Duty Game
3.4 Randomizing versus Mixing: The Auditing Game
3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
Notes
Problems
4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
4.1 Subgame Perfectness
4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I
4.3 Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in Nuisance
Suits
4.4 Recoordination to Pareto Dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto
Perfection
Notes
Problems
5 Reputation and Repeated Games
5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox
5.2 Inˉnitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk
Theorem
5.3 Reputation: The One-Sided Prisoner's Dilemma
5.4 Product Quality in an Inˉnitely Repeated Game
*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in Customer Switching
Costs
*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game (formerly Section
4.6)
Notes
Problems
6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III
6.2 Reˉning Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: PhD Admissions
6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and
V
6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The
Gang of Four Model
6.5 The Axelrod Tournament
*6.6 Why Established Firms Pay Less for Capital: The DiamondModel
(formerly Section 15.1)
Notes
Problems
PART II ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game
7.3 The Incentive Compatibility, Participation, and Competition Constraints
7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game
Notes
Problems
8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard
8.1 E±ciency Wages (formerly Section 8.4)
8.2 Tournaments (formerly Section 8.5)
8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems (formerly Section 8.6)
*8.4 Renegotiation: The Repossession Game
*8.5 State-Space Diagrams: Insurance Games I' and II' (formerly Section
7.5)
*8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model
(formerly Section 8.7)
Notes
Problems
9 Adverse Selection
9.1 Introduction: Production Game V
9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II
9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV
9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III
*9.5 MarketMicrostructure and the Kyle Model (formerly Section 15.3)
*9.6 A Variety of Applications
Notes
Problems
9a Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and in Moral Hazard with Hidden
Information
9a.1 The Revelation Principle and Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge
(formerly Section 8.1)
9a.2 An Example of Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman
Game (formerly Section 8.2)
*9a.3 Price Discrimination (new)
9a.4 Rate of Return Regulation and Government Procurement (formerly
Section 15.4)
*9a.5 The Groves Mechanism (formerly Section 9.6)
Notes
Problems
10 Signalling
10.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling
10.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education
10.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education
10.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening
*10.5 Two Signals: Underpricing of Stock
*10.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing (formerly Section 14.2)
Notes
Problems
PART III APPLICATIONS
11 Bargaining
11.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie
11.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
11.3 Alternating O?ers over Finite Time
11.4 Alternating O?ers over Inˉnite Time
11.5 Incomplete Information
11.6 Setting up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Mechanism
(new)
Notes
Problems
12 Auctions
12.1 Auction Classiˉcation and Private-Value Strategies
12.2 Comparing Auction Rules
12.3 Risk and Uncertainty over Values
12.4 Common-Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
12.5 Information in Common-Value Auctions
Notes
Problems
13 Pricing
13.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited
13.2 Prices as Strategies
13.3 Location Models
*13.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games
*13.5 Durable Monopoly
Notes
Problems
*14 Entry
*14.1 Innovation and Patent Races
*14.2 Takeovers and Greenmail (formerly Section 15.2)
*14.3 Predatory Pricing: The Kreps-Wilson Model
*14.4 Entry for Buyout
Notes
Problems
*A Mathematical Appendix
*A.1 Notation
*A.2 Glossary
*A.3 Formulas and Functions
*A.4 Probability Distributions
*A.5 Supermodularity
*A.6 Fixed-Point Theorems
*A.7 Genericity (new)
*A.8 Discounting (formerly Section 4.5)
*A.9 Risk (new)
References and Name Index
Subject Index
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